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COMMENT

NUCLEAR EMPLOYERS NO LONGER
SHIELDED FROM WHISTLEBLOWER
STATE TORT CLAIMS: FALLOUT FROM
ENGLISH v. GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY'
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1978, Congress amended the Energy Reorganization Act of
1974,2 adding section 210.a This amendment provided employees in
the nuclear industry with a valuable federal statute to combat workplace discrimination.4 This law created a federal remedy to deter re1. 496 U.S_ 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988).
The Congress hereby declares that the general welfare and the common defense and
security require effective action to develop, and increase the efficiency and reliability
of use of, all energy sources to meet the needs of present and future generations, to
increase the productivity of the national economy and strength its position in regard
to international trade, to make the Nation self-sufficient in energy, to advance the
goals of restoring, protecting, and enhancing environmental quality, and to assure
public health and safety.
42 U.S.C. § 5801 (a) (1988).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) (1988) (protecting any person whose employer is licensed
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC"), or has applied for a license, or is a contractor or subcontractor of a NRC licensee or applicant).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) (1988). "No employer. . . may discharge any employee or
otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) (1988); but see National
Labor Relations Act, § 8 (a) (3), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3) (1988). "It shall be unfair labor
practice for an employer by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment . . . to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a) (3)
(1988).
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taliation5 against "whistleblowers" who might highlight possible
health or safety problems at nuclear facilities.6 However, in spite of
this federal legislation, many employees have elected to sue in state
court or pursue litigation in both federal and state forums.1 Consequently, numerous recent decisions raised the question of whether
state actions were preempted by the federal statute.8
English v. General.Electric Company9 narrowed the scope of

the federal whistleblower statute. In deciding the question of
whether federal law preempted a state law cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress resulting from retaliatory employer conduct, the United States Supreme Court held that petitioner's tort claim was not preempted. 10 Moreover, the Court opened
the door to future punitive damage claims."
The preemption defense will no longer shield nuclear industry
employers who discriminate against whistleblowers and, consequently, are sued under a state tort claim. 12 As these suits become
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (b) (1988).
If. . . the Secretary [of Labor] determines that a violation of subsection (a) of this
section has occurred, the Secretary shall order the person who committed such violation to (i) take affirmative actioji to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the
complainant to his former position together with the compensation (including back
pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the Secretary may
order such person to provide compensatory damages to the complainant.
42 U.S.C. § 5851 (b) (2) (B) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (d) (1988). "Whenever a
person has failed to comply with an order issued under subsection (b) (2) of this section, the
Secretary may file a civil action in

. .

. United States district court

. .

. [which] shall have

jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages." 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (d) (1988).
6. See Kohn & Carpenter, Nuclear Whistleblower Protection and the Scope of Protected Activity under Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 4 ANTiOcH L.J. 73, 74
(1986) (defining a whistleblower as an employee who discloses conduct by his or her employer
which the employee reasonably believes to be "a violation of any law, rule or regulation, mismanagement, corruption, abuse of authority or threat to public health and safety at the worksite"). Id.
7. See Note, Wrongful Discharge and Federal Preemptiorn Nuclear Whistleblower
Protection underState Law and Section 210 of the Energy ReorganizationAct, 17 B.C. ENV.
AFF. L. REV. 405, 408-21 (1990).
8. See infra notes 164-206 and accompanying text (discussing jurisdictional conflicts
within the scope of federal preemption under section 210).
9. 496 U.S., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
10. Id. at-._ 110 S. Ct. at.2272,
11. Id. at., 110 S. Ct. at 2280; see infra note 229 and accompanying text.
12. See Kohn & Kohn, An Overview of Federaland State Whistleblower Protections, 4
ANTIOCH L.J. 99, 111 (1986). Employees often include other more traditional claims in their
retaliatory discharge complaints. Id. These include a breach of the employment contract, an
implied contract, an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence, fraud, defamation of character, invasion of privacy and an intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id.
Workers who file claims under those causes of action are entitled to jury trials and punitive
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more costly in the aftermath of the English decision, employers will
be forced to address nuclear employee complaints by other means,
including altering radiological safety procedures.
The English decision further represents a landmark in the field
of non-nuclear employee rights. Although the Court dealt solely with
federal nuclear law, the impact of this decision is much broader.
Seven other statutes contain identical or similar whistleblower protections affecting virtually all of the Nation's manufacturers and
businesses.13 Whistleblowers everywhere who suffer from employer
discrimination, should now be able to proceed with their civil actions
in state court.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the importance of
4
nuclear safety in the commercial nuclear utility plant environment,
15
as well as the states' strong interest in promoting such care. It will
review the extent to which Congress has preempted the nuclear
safety field.' This Comment will then assess the judicial foundation
upon which the Supreme Court's reasoning in English v. General
Electric Company was based. 17 Following a discussion of the English
decision itself,' 8 this Comment will evaluate the impact of that holding upon American employers' future conduct in addressing employee complaints and subsequent litigation.' 9 Finally, this Comment
will conclude that the English decision fosters prompt employer response to whistleblower complaints.
II.

IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR SAFETY

A.

How Nuclear Power Works

Nuclear energy is created through a the process by which a decaying uranium atom2 0 emits a neutron 21 which is absorbed by andamage awards. Id. at 108.
13. See infra notes 230-70 and accompanying text (discussing six other environmental
statutes and one mine safety regulation).
14. See infra notes 20-82 and accompanying text (addressing nuclear safety concerns).
15. See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (analyzing in detail the states' strong
interest in promoting nuclear safety).
16. See infra notes 108-35 and accompanying text (discussing congressional preemption

in the nuclear safety field).
17. See infra notes 136-206 and accompanying text (addressing various section 210
decisions).
18. See infra notes 207-29 and accompanying text (analyzing the Court's holding).
19. See infra notes 230-70 and accompanying text (postulating employers' future actions
regarding various safety fields).

20. See J. LAMARSH, INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR ENGINEERING 8 (1983). Atoms are
the building blocks of gross matter as it is seen and felt. Id. The atom consists of a small but
massive nucleus surrounded by a cloud of rapidly moving electrons. Id.: see also BABCOCK &
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other nearby uranium nucleus, 22 causing this second nucleus to fission (split),23 releasing thermal energy (heat), neutrons and other
forms of radiation.24 Many of these "second generation" neutrons
are themselves absorbed by subsequent uranium nuclei, resulting in
a "nuclear chain reaction. 25 Sustaining and controlling these millions of reactions each second occurs inside a nuclear reactor. 2
A reactor consists of a core, which is filled with pellets of uranium packed in bundles of thin cylindrical rods. Inserted into the
uranium core are still other rods, usually composed of cadmium or
boron, which absorb the emitted neutrons. 2 These "control rods"
WILCOX, STEAM/ITs GENERATION AND USE 20-3 (1978). Isotopes that occur in nature are
stable, especially those of atomic number 84 and above. Id. The unstable nuclides undergo
spontaneous change at definite rates by radioactive disintegration or radioactive decay. Id.
21. See LAMARSH, supra note 20, at 7. The mass of neutron is slightly larger than the
mass of the proton and it is electrically neutral. Id. The neutron is only stable when it is bound
into an atomic nucleus. Id.
22. Id. at 8. A nucleus is composed of neutrons and protons. Id.
23. See I. KAPLAN, NUCLEAR PHYSICS 637 (1962). "The large amount of energy released in fission, together with the emission of more than one neutron, has made it possible to
use the fission process as a source of energy." Id.

24.

See BABCOCK & WILCOX, supra note 20,at 20-13. Other forms of radiation include

alpha, beta and gamma radiation. Id. Alpha particles are not harmful when the source of
radiation is located outside the human body because ordinary clothing or even a single sheet of
paper stops all of them. Id. However, if alpha radiation is ingested or inhaled into the body, it
can have serious consequences. Id. Beta rays penetrate up to an inch of wood or plastic material and travel several yards in air. Id. Gamma rays are essentially powerful x-rays and penetrate completely through the body. Id. Consequently, shielding is required to protect employees
from high-energy bata and gamma radiation. Id. In nuclear power plants, several feet of concrete shielding must be utilized. Id. Where special considerations prohibit the use of concrete,
lesser amounts of steel or lead can be used. Id.
25. See KAPLAN, supra note 23, at 637. "The emission, on average of 2.5 neutrons in the
fission of a [uranium] nucleus permits a chain reaction in which these neutrons produce more
fissions and more neutrons, and so on." Id.
26. Id. Under certain conditions, the numbers of fissions and neutrons increase exponentially with time because each fission produces more neutrons than the one absorbed, and the
amount of energy released can become enormous. Id. The time interval between successive
generations of fissions can be a very small fraction of a second and the energy released in the
chain reaction can take the form of an explosion, resulting in an "atomic bomb." Id,Under
other conditions the chain reaction can be controlled, and a steady state can be attained in
which just as many neutrons are produced per unit time as are used up. Id. If the rate at
which fissions occur and energy is released is kept constant, the result is a nuclear reactor,
which can be used as a source of neutrons or of power. Id.
27. See E. LEWIs, NUCLEAR POWER REACTOR'SAFETY 36-37 (1977). A nuclear reactor
most often consists of an array of cylindrical cells, each of which extends the axial length of
the core. Id. Each cell includes a fuel element, consisting of fuel, cladding regions and coolant
channels. Id.
28. Id. at 38. Provisions are made in the reactor core for the location of control poisons
that are varied to compensate for fuel depletion and temperature effects as well as to change
reactor power level and shut down the reactor. Id.
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regulate the neutron flux and, therefore, the reaction rate.2 9 A nuclear reactor is "started-up" by raising the control rods to precisely

calculated levels.30 The neutron population increases until "steadystate" conditions are attained and the reactor is "critical." 31 Heat,
one of the by-products of the fission process, is carried away by high

pressure water which is circulating constantly through channels inside the reactor core.

2

In the United States, commercial utilities utilize two major
types of nuclear reactors: the boiling water reactor,3 3 (hereinafter

"BWR"); and the pressurized water reactor,34 (hereinafter "PWR").

In both of these systems, the thermal energy generated inside the

reactor is utilized to heat water into steam. This steam is then piped
to a turbine,35 connected to a generator,3 6 which, when turned, produces electricity.

7

29. Id. Control rods are utilized to maintain fine control over reactor power level and
compensate for neutron flux effects. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 39. Shim rods are utilized to bring the reactor critical and for coarse power
level control. Id. Control rods are normally completely out of the core when the reactor is at
full power. Id. However, these rods are kept in a "cocked" position outside the core while it is
critical. Id.; see LAMARSH, supra note 20, at 102. When the nuclear chain reaction proceeds
at a constant rate, the reactor is said to be "critical." Id.
32. Id.; see BABCOCK & WILCOX, supra note 20, at 19-3. In a pressurized water reactor,
the reactor coolant is maintained under pressure sufficiently high enough to prevent boiling. Id.
Steam is generated in heat exchangers in which the coolant transfers its heat energy to the
secondary water system to produce steam. Id. In boiling water reactors, the reactor coolant is
allowed to boil and steam is produced in the reactor. Id.

33. See

NORTHEAST UTILITIES, NUCLEAR POWER AT NORTHEAST UTILITIES

6 (1989). In

a BWR, the heat from nuclear fission causes water flowing through the reactor to boil into
steam which flows directly to the turbine-generator. Id. The steam then leaves the turbine and
passes through a condenser where it is cooled and changed back into water. Id. The water is
pumped back to the reactor and the cycle begins again. Id.
34. Id. In a PWR, the water flowing through the reactor is heated under pressure to
keep it from boiling. Id. This "primary system" water flows to steam generators where its heat
is transferred through the walls of tubes to another body of water, the "secondary system,"
which is allowed to boil. Id. The resulting steam drives the turbine. Id. The steam then leaves
the turbine and passes into a condenser where it is cooled and changed back into water. Id.
Pumps return the secondary system water to the steam generator for reheating and reuse in
the plant cycle. Id.

35. See F.

RAHN.

A. ADAMANTIADES, J.

KENTON

& C.

BRAUN.

A

GUIDE TO NUCLEAR

POWER TECHNOLOGY 354 (1984) [hereinafter "RAHN"]. "A steam turbine is a device in
which the energy stored in steam in the form of high temperature and pressure is converted
into an impulse on the moving blades of the rotor and hence into rotating energy of the shaft."
Id.
36. See BUREAU OF NAVAL PERSONNEL, PRINCIPLES OF NAVAL ENGINEERING 506
(1970). The alternating-current generator rotor may be driven by a steam turbine. Id. Direct
current is passed through windings on the rotor, forming a rotating magnetic field. Id. As the
rotor turns, alternating output voltages are induced in the stationery stator windings. Id.
37. See RAHN, supra note 35, at 21.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1991

5

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [1991], Art. 7
Hofstra Labor Law Journal

B.

[Vol. 8:2

Application to the Commercial Generation of Electricity

Worldwide, nuclear energy is utilized to generate the electrical
equivalent of more than seven and one-half million barrels of oil per
day.38 In the United States, more than 100 reactors3 9 now generate
the electrical equivalent of about two million barrels of oil per day 40
and provide over fourteen percent of the nation's electricity. 41
The lure of nuclear energy, however, carries with it the additional responsibility of minimizing the unseen but potentially lethal
danger of radiation. 42 Beta and gamma radiation unleashed through
the fission process can cause biological damage to living tissue.43 The
amount of damage depends on the intensity of the radiation. 44 During the course of their work, most employees at commercial nuclear
power facilities are exposed to some minimal amounts of this radia38. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at i. Furthermore, the commitment to the
development of nuclear power continues to grow. Id. There are now more than 300 operating
reactors outside the U.S. and more than 200 additional nuclear power plants are either under
construction or planned. Id.
39. See J. TOMAIN & J. HICKEY, JR. WITH S. HOLLIS, ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 389
(1989) [hereinafter "TOMAIN & HIcKEY"]. "At the end of 1987, there were 107 commercial
nuclear reactors operating in the United States, seven units in 'startup' status, an additional 19
units had construction permits, and two plants were on order for a total of 125 possible nuclear
generating units." Id.
40. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at i.
41. See TOMAIN & HICKEY, supra note 39, at 389. However, no new commercial nuclear power plants have been built in thee U.S. since 1978 and all commercial reactors ordered
since 1974 have been canceled; see also NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at i (opining
that "rapidly escalating construction costs coupled with decreasing growth in demand for electricity eventually led to the end of new reactor orders and the cancellation of many plants
under construction."). Id.
42. See LEWIs, supra note 27, at 13.
43. Id. at 14. Gamma and beta radiation from fission products can cause damage in very
different ways. Id. Gamma rays penetrate the human body at even moderate energy levels and
produce a uniform radiation absorption dose over the whole body. Id. By contrast, charged
beta particles penetrate only the surface tissue, resulting in skin burns similar to sunburn. Id.;
see also Begley, The 20th - Century Plague, TIME, May 12, 1986, at 36. Radiation "wreaks
havoc on the body's proteins and genes, causing both short- and long-term injury. The impact
is greatest on tissues in which cells reproduce rapidly: skin cells, bone-marrow cells, intestinal
cells and the cells from which spring eggs and sperm." Id.
44. Id. Radiation injury is unpredictable. Id. The effects of radiation vary according to
the isotopes involved. Id. Different isotopes concentrate in different tissues of the body, where
after many years of exposure, may cause cancer. Id. The higher the dosage of radiation, the
sooner the effects. Id. At moderate levels, radiation sickness may occur, resulting in loss of
appetite, nausea and diarrhea. Id. At higher radiation levels, high fevers occur and victims lose
weight and become lethargic as their gastrointestinal tracts lose the ability to absorb nutrients.
Id. Damage to blood-forming tissue produces a drastic lowering of the white blood cell count,
crippling defenses against infection. Id. Very high levels of radiation result in death. Id. However, radiation levels decrease rapidly with distance. Id.
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tion and therefore are classified as "radiation workers." 45 The radiation exposure of an employee is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission ("NRC").46 Radiation exposure standards are based on
the lifetime maximum limits which an employee can be exposed to
during the normal course of his duties without an increase in the risk
of health or genetic effects. 47 The goal is to reduce a nuclear employee's radiation exposure levels to those as low as reasonably

achievable.48
Consequently, it is necessary to ensure that commercial nuclear

facility plants are designed, constructed and tested to insure absolute
control over the release of excess radioactive material under all circumstances. 49 This is accomplished through the use of three levels of
containment. 50 First, radioactive fuel is encased in a protective metal
coating or "cladding" to prevent release. 5 1 The reactor, its associated

piping and components constitute a second barrier to the release of
harmful radiation. 52 Finally, the reactor system containment build-

ing prevents any escape of harmful radioactive material. 53 All three
45. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at 20. Continuous self-monitoring is accomplished through the use of dosimeters, which are devices that indicate how much radiation
has been received. Id. at 21. To obtain a more accurate radiation record, thermoluminescent
dosimeters ("TLD's") may also be worn. Id.; see supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing forms of radiation).
46. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at 20; see also NORTHEAST UTILITIES, A
Report to our Neighbors (1986). Human exposure to radiation is measured in units called
"reins" or, more commonly, "millirems," one thousandth of a rem. Id.; see also How Much is
Too Much, TIME, April 19, 1979, at 16. The NRC has set a permissible annual level of radiation exposure for the general public of 500 millirems and 5,000 millirems for nuclear power
plant workers. Id.; see also D. OKRENT, NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY 42-43 (1981). The upper
limit of exposure in a nuclear accident should be no higher than the maximum once-in-alifetime emergency dose of 25,000 millirem. Id.
47. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 33, at 20; see also How Much is Too Much,
TIME, supra note 46, at 16. Over a year's time, the average American is exposed to 100-200
millirems. Id. This is roughly equivalent to the exposure from 10-20 chest x-rays. Id. About 50
percent of that radiation comes from the sun and cosmic rays, another 45 percent from exposure to diagnostic and therapeutic medical equipment, and only about 5 percent from atomic
fallout and household products such as television and microwave ovens. Id.
48.

See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, NEw EMPLOYEE TRAINING, Safety-2.

49. See 0. JONES, JR., NUCLEAR REACTOR SAFETY HEAT TRANSFER 78 (1981).
50. Id.
51. Id. The current practice is to design the nuclear system to insure that cladding temperatures never exceed a limit that would lead to melting, cracking, rupturing or oxidizing. Id.
52. Id. Even if one or more fuel elements were to be breached, the system barrier would
also have to be breached in order to release radioactivity. Id. However, this could occur
through valve stem leaks, pump bearing seal leaks, instrument line leaks, purging through vent
or relief valves, or in the extreme case, primary piping rupture. Id.
53. Id. The reactor system is located inside a hugh containment building which is generally held at sub-atmospheric pressures to insure that any atmospheric leakage is inward. Id.
The containment structures are designed to hold the entire contents of the primary system in
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of these barriers must be breached before substantial levels of radioactivity can be released.
Furthermore, nuclear power plants must be operated without
undue risk to the health and safety of their employees and the public
at large. "[H]uman factors and the effectiveness of people determine
success or failure at every stage, from the design of a [nuclear] plant
and its equipment, through manufacture, construction, installation,
and calibration, to testing, [operation], maintenance, repair, and
management." 4 Achievement of this objective requires that nuclear
employees at all levels create and maintain safe working conditions. 55 However, numerous safety system shutdowns" have occurred
throughout the nuclear power industry from the seemingly innocent

jarring or bumping of sensitive equipment by employees.5 7 As a result, strict adherence to established safety rules and practices, as

well as the elimination of any unsafe activities, is especially necessary in the commercial nuclear power industry.
the event of a rupture. Id.
54. Sheridan, Human Error in Nuclear Power Plants, TECH. REv., Feb. 1980, at 28.
Human errors occur with alarming frequency in complex systems such as nuclear facilities. Id.
at 25. Human failure rates are higher, typically by a factor of 100, than those of major
mechanical or electrical components in a nuclear plant. Id. at 26. Moreover, under conditions
of high stress, such as a casualty or accident, human failure rates may approach 100 percent.
Id. Consequently, the NRC requires three licensed operators in or near the control room of
every operating nuclear reactor 24 hours a day. Id. One of these, the shift supervisor, must
have passed a higher level of NRC certification than the others. Id.
55. See Williams, Governmental Drug Testing: Critique and Analysis of Fourth
Amendment Jurisprudence,8 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 1, 7 (1990) (footnotes omitted). "[D]rug use
creates safety hazards in the workplace. Drug users create safety problems not only for themselves, but also for co-workers and the public. Drug users are thought have higher incidence of
workplace injuries and accidents causing serious injury to others." Id.; see also Castro, Battling the Enemy within, TIME, Mar. 17, 1986, at 59. "Drug users are three times as likely as
nonusers to injure themselves or someone else." Id. "Federal experts estimate that between
10% and 23% of all U.S. workers use dangerous drugs on the job." Id. at 53.
56. See JONEs, supra note 49, at 123. In a nuclear power plant, the electrical power
output from the turbine generator is directly related to the neutron flux generated in the core.
Id. Controlling the neutron flux to meet electrical demand is the function of a reactor control
system. Id. In order to reduce the millions of fissions per second, a system of control rods
entering the nuclear core in a controlled, deliberate manner acts to slowdown the nuclear reaction. Id. If this is accomplished automatically, it is considered a system trip. Id. If faster
system shutdown is required, a "scram" (acronym for the now ancient Safety Control Rod
Axe Man) can be utilized. Id. at 79. The nuclear scram is a method to rapidly shut down the
fission process by immediate control rod insertion in the event of an unacceptably rapid uppower excursion. Id.

57. See NORTHEAST

UTILITIES,

supra note 48, at Safety-8. "Since 1984, an average of

35 such events per year (including approximately eight at-power scrams/trips per year) have
been reported to the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations ('INPO')." Id.
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C. Nuclear Accidents

When adherence to nuclear safety procedures becomes lax, disaster can result. Nuclear disaster is personified in the word
"Chernobyl.

5 8a

Although many of the causes and effects of the acci-

dent at Chernobyl are still in dispute, the first indication that a nuclear-related problem had occurred in the Soviet Union came from

Sweden, Finland and Denmark, who reported abnormally high levels
of radioactivity. 59 On April 28, 1986, the Soviet public news agency,

TASS, announced that "[a]n accident has occurred at the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant and one of the reactors was damaged." 60
Apparently, technicians at Chernobyl had planned an experiment to determine how long the steam-driven turbines at the nuclear
plant would continue to generate electricity if an unexpected power

loss occurred. 6 ' The chain of events that led to the disaster began on
April 25, 1986, when plant operators began reducing the reactor's

power level and disconnecting vital reactor protection systems in
preparation for the test.62 On April 26, the workers began the actual

experiment by reducing core cooling water flow and shutting off
steam flow to the turbine.63 The graphite core immediately began to
overheat, and since the emergency cooling system had been disconnected hours earlier, there was no backup system available to cool
the reactor.64 Within seconds, an enormous nuclear power surge
58. See The Chernobyl Syndrome, NEWSWEEK, May 12, 1986, at 22. The Chernobyl
Nuclear Station is located in the town of Pripyat, about 80 miles north of Kiev, U.S.S.R. Id.
59. See NORTHEAST UTILITIES, supra note 46 and accompanying text.
60. Id. The Chernobyl complex was comprised of four 1000 megawatt graphite-moderated nuclear reactors. Id. A "moderator" is utilized to slow down neutrons so that a nuclear
reaction can take place. Id. U.S. reactors use water as a moderator over graphite for several
reasons. Id. First, safety problems associated with graphite, a potentially flammable material,
inside the reactor core are eliminated. Id. Additionally, the related complex support systems
are also unnecessary. Id. Second, water moderation allows for both operational flexibility and
beneficial accident response because as the temperature of water increases, its reactivity characteristics decrease. Id. Finally, graphite reactors are much larger and more complex compared to their U.S. counterparts. Id.
61. See Marbach, Anatomy of a Catastrophe,NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 1986, at 26.
62. Id. At 1 a.m., technicians began slowly lowering reactor power in conjunction with
the impending test. Id. At 2 p.m., workers deliberately shut off the plant's emergency cooling
system. Id. However, since a dispatcher wanted the reactor to continue to supply electricity to
the region, operators allowed the reactor to continue to run at 50 percent power for nine hours,
in violation of safety protocol. Id.
63. Id. At 1:23 a.m., operators began their experiment by shutting off valves to prevent
steam from reaching the turbine-generator. Id. This would have caused the reactor to shut
down, but workers wanted to be able to repeat the test if it failed, so they bypassed the automatic protection signal. Id.
64. Id. at 27. Within seconds, the reactor coolant pumps slowed, causing heat buildup
and a steam bubble to form in the core, triggering a runaway reaction. Id. About 40 seconds
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caused two explosions, which blew off the roof of the reactor building and started numerous fires.6 5 The graphite reactor core was exposed to the atmosphere and began to burn intensely, reaching temperatures of 2,800 degrees Fahrenheit." This inferno burned for
twelve days, spewing deadly radioactive isotopes into the air, where
67
winds carried them thousands of miles.
The long-term effects of the Chernobyl nuclear accident remain
undetermined and it will be many years before any definite conclusions can be drawn. However, the region surrounding the Chernobyl
nuclear power plant will continue to be dangerous for many years,
with radiation levels as high as 2,500 times above normal.6 8 Approximately 135,000 people were evacuated from a 300 square mile area
surrounding the facility. 9 Ultimately, experts estimate that over
5,000 people will die in years to come from cancer caused by exposure to the high radiation levels.7 0 The Chernobyl accident demonstrated the seriousness of safety problems relating to nuclear
reactors.
Although the United States has never hosted an accident of
similar magnitude as that which occurred at Chernobyl, there have
been safety system failures which have resulted in incidents at commercial nuclear utility plants.7 1 The Three Mile Island ("TMI") incident serves as a grim reminder to the American nuclear industry of
what can occur when employee training and adherence to safety proafter the test started, the shift manager realized the magnitude of the problem and attempted
to scram the reactor. Id. This attempt failed. Id.
65. Id. At 1:24 a.m., two tremendous explosions rocked the plant. Id. Experts conclude
that the first explosion probably resulted from the steam pressure inside the reactor which
caused tubes in the core to rupture. Id. The second explosion, most likely due to the subsequent increase in hydrogen concentration, blew the top off the building. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. The fire sent a plume of radioactive debris into the upper atmosphere while Soviet fire fighters in helicopters frantically attempted to extinguish the blaze by dumping 5,000
tons of boron, lead and other material onto the core below. Id. They did not succeed in putting
out the fires until twelve days after the accident. Id.
68. Id. at 26.
69. Id.
70. See Marbach, supra note 61, at 26. As much or more radiation was released at
Chernobyl as in the atomic bomb attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Id.
71. See 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1988).
The term "nuclear incident" means any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence, within the United States causing, within or outside the United
States, bodily injury, sickness, disease, or death, or loss of or damage to property, or
loss of use of property, arising out of or resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties of source, special nuclear, or byproduct material.
42 U.S.C. § 2014 (q) (1988).
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cedures becomes complacent.

2

On March 28, 1979, employees of

TMI Unit 2 were working on sensitive plant equipment with the reactor operating at 97 percent power.7 3 The crew inadvertently cut off
one of the supplies of water necessary to remove reactor heat. 74 De-

spite the error, emergency safety systems should have been able to
automatically shut down and adequately cool the reactor.7 5 However,

the uranium fuel reached dangerously high temperatures and the re76
actor core came within thirty to sixty minutes of a "meltdown.1

Radioactivity escaped from the containment building and the Governor of Pennsylvania ordered the precautionary evacuation of residents from the surrounding area. This accident resulted from a
combination of factors, including equipment malfunction, inadequate
72. See Stoler, Legacy of Three Mile Island, TIME, Mar. 24, 1980, at 58. Metropolitan
Edison's Three Mile Island nuclear plant is located on the Susquehanna River in Middletown
Pennsylvania. Id.
73. See D. FORD, THE CULT OF THE ATOM: THE SECRET PAPERS OF THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION 230 (1982).

74. Id.; see A Nuclear Nightmare, TIME, Apr. 9, 1979, at 8. Just after 4 a.m. there as a
feedwater pump failure which caused the steam generator to boil dry in a matter of minutes.
Id. Consequently, the steam supply dwindled, tripping the 880-megawatt turbine generator off
line. Id.
75. Id.; see BABCOCK & WILCOX, supra note 20, at 21-11. The reactor protection system automatically monitors system parameters to prevent the nuclear reactor from entering an
unsafe operating condition. Id. It will shut down (trip or "scram") the reactor when power,
reactor outlet coolant temperature, or coolant pressure reach preset maximum limits. Id. It
will also trip the reactor when coolant pressure reaches a preset minimum value which is a
function of coolant temperature. Id. Additionally, the reactor is also tripped by axial power
imbalance, by ratios of neutron flux to reactor coolant flow that are too high for safe operation,
or upon loss of power to the reactor protection system. Id.
76. See FORD, supra note 73, at 231. The core cooling systems are designed to totally
submerge the reactor core in water. Id. If the cooling system malfunctions, the reactor core
can overheat immensely, resulting in a "meltdown" in which the heat causes the uranium core
to liquefy and breach the metal and concrete containment barriers, releasing quantities of
radioactive materials into the environment. Id.
77. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2014 (1988).
The term "precautionary evacuation" means an evacuation of the public within a
specified area near a nuclear facility, or the transportation route in the case of an
accident involving transportation of source material, special nuclear material, byproduct material, high-level radioactive waste, spent nuclear fuel, or transuranic
waste to or from a production or utilization facility, if the evacuation is (1) the
result of any event that is not classified as a nuclear incident but that poses imminent danger of bodily injury or property damage from the radiological properties of
source material, special nuclear material, byproduct material, high-level radioactive
waste, spent nuclear fuel, or transuranic waste, and causes an evacuation; and (2)
initiated by an official of a State or a political subdivision of a State, who is authorized by State law to initiate such an evacuation and who reasonably determined that
such an evacuation was necessary to protect the public health and safety.
42 U.S.C. § 2014 (gg) (1988).
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instrumentation and human error."8
In the aftermath of the Three Mile Island accident, shortcomings in nuclear plant safety systems and NRC safety procedures
were uncovered.79 Consequently, the NRC increased safety inspections at other commercial nuclear power plants, stepped up enforcement of those regulations and promulgated emergency preparedness
rules.8 0 Secret nuclear weapons production facilities have also received greater scrutiny after nuclear whistleblower complaints revealed inadequate safety standards.81 Moreover, there have been recent allegations of shortcomings in the safety of Navy nuclear
reactors.8 2 However, these controversies are beyond the scope of this
Comment.
D. States' Interest in Promoting Nuclear Safety
The "franchise to operate a public utility. . . is a special privilege which . . .may be granted or withheld at the pleasure of the

State."8 " Furthermore, every state has a strong interest in making
electricity available at reasonable rates as well as protecting resi78. See FORD, supra note 73, at 230. First, a pressure relief valve opened to relieve
excessive primary plant pressure caused by the overheating. Id. However, once opened, this
relief valve stuck open, causing an uncontrolled loss of primary coolant. Id. Second, the Unit 2
control room did not indicate that this valve was stuck open. Id. Consequently, this valve
remained open for more than two hours. Id. Finally, plant operators, believing the reactor to
be adequately supplied with cooling water, errored in shutting off the emergency core cooling
pumps. Id.
79. Id. at 231. A Presidential commission report disclosed errors ranging from improper
installation of control room instruments so that they could not be read, to the NRC's lack of a
comprehensive system to monitor the safety of U.S. reactors. Id.
80. See TorMIN & HICKEY, supra note 39, at 394.
81. See Ahearne, Fixing the Nation'sNuclear-Weapons Plants, TEcH.Rv., July 1989,
at 24. The Department of Energy ("DOE"), runs the nation's nuclear weapons production
program. Id. Efforts to uncover problems with the DOE weapons complex began in the late
1970's, when Senator John Glenn received complaints about work safety practices at uranium
enrichment plants in Ohio. Id. As a result of these complaints and the comprehensive investigation that ensued, a plutonium plant in Hanford, Washington was permanently closed and
three tritium plants in Savannah River, South Carolina were also shut down due to operational
and repair concerns. Id.
82. See Safety, Secrecy of Navy Reactors Stirs Controversy, The New London Day
(Connecticut), Jan. 1, 1991, § A, at I, col. 5. Former employees of the Navy's prestigious
nuclear reactor program have accused the West Milton, N.Y. site of serious safety lapses and
claim they were disciplined for their whistleblowing activities. Id. Their allegations have contributed to pressure in Washington, D.C. for wider scrutiny over the Navy's training and research centers. Id. In a written statement, officials of the Naval Reactors program stated,
"[a]ll naval prototype reactors have engineered safeguards to help insure safe operation. ...
The stringent design requirements of naval reactor fuel, the conservative design of naval reactor plants, and the detailed training and qualification of naval reactor operators make the
likelihood of a naval reactor accident extremely small." Id. at 16, col. 6.
83. Frost v. Corporation Comm'n, 278 U.S. 515, 534 (1934) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
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dents, wildlife and other natural resources from the effects of radia-

tion exposure. 4 This interest has long been recognized as one of the
states' established "police powers."

5

By 1959, twenty-nine states

had passed legislation concerning nuclear energy and radiation
safety.86 In the late 1970's and early 1980's, in a second wave of
state legislation, several states passed laws extensively policing the

commercial nuclear industry.

7

Many of these state statutes explic-

itly referred to local health and safety concerns.8 8

States have never been specifically excluded from regulating nuclear energy. Section 271 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
("AEA") stated that it was not to ". . . be construed to affect the

authority or regulations of any Federal, State or local agency with
respect to the generation, sale or transmission of electric power pro-

duced through the use of nuclear facilities licensed by the [Atomic
Energy] Commission." 8 The legislative history of section 271 indi-

cates that Congress intended the production of electricity by nuclear
power plants to be subject to the same state authority as is the pro-

duction of electricity by conventional power plants."' In 1959, Congress amended the AEA, adding section 274. 91 This amendment
codified the procedure by which the Atomic Energy Commission
("AEC") could transfer its regulatory authority over certain types of
84. See Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of New York,
447 U.S. 557, 569 (1980) (stating that "[t]he State's concern that [electricity] rates be fair
and efficient represents a clear and substantial governmental interest."). Id.
85. See Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940). A unanimous Supreme Court upheld
a state highway safety law which prohibited an activity that the Interstate Commerce Commission, pursuant to a federal statute, found to be safe. Id. The Court referred to the state's
interest in protecting human life. Id.
86. See Federal-State Relationships in the Atomic Energy Field: Hearings Before the
Joint Commission on Atomic Energy, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 128 (1959).
87. These states included: California: CAL. PUB. REs. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West
1986); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 251-256 (1980); Montana: MONT. CODE ANN.
§§ 75-20-1201 to 1205 (1989); and Oregon: OR. Rav. STAT. §§ 469.010-.994 (1989).
88. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. §§ 469.010-.994 (1989). This Oregon statute declares that
the intention of the state is to assert jurisdiction to the full extent of its constitutional ability.
Id. Furthermore, it allows a state official to order the shutdown of a commercial nuclear utility
without a prior hearing if he or she has "cause to believe that there is [a] clear and immediate
danger to the public health and safety from continued operation of the plant or installation
....
" OR. REv. STAT. § 469.550 (1989).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1988).
90. See Pacific Legal Found. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n,
659 F.2d 903, 920 (9th Cir. 1981) (citing 100 CONG. REC. 12,015 (1954) (containing the
statement of Sen. Hickenlooper)). "We take the position that electricity is electricity. Once it
is produced it should be subject to the proper regulatory body, whether it be the Federal Power
Commission in the case of interstate transmission, or State regulatory bodies if such exist, or
municipal regulatory bodies." Id.
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988).
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radioactive material to the states.92 By this action, states were given
the authority to regulate those materials "for the protection of the
public health and safety from radiation hazards.19 3 Moreover, Congress made clear that section 274 was not intended to curtail existing
state authority outside the NRC's jurisdiction, stating that it was not
to ". . . be construed to affect the authority of any State or local
agency to regulate activities for purposes other than protection
against radiation hazards. 94
III. EXTENT TO WHICH CONGRESS HAS PREEMPTED THE FIELD OF
NUCLEAR SAFETY

A.

Preemption Generally

Federal and state governments share the power to regulate the
commercial nuclear industry. Occasionally, this joint authority creates conflict between the two as each attempts to address the economic, health and safety concerns prevalent in the nuclear energy
field. When discord exists between the two legislative bodies, the issue of preemption arises. However, "we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress."9 5
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution provides that the laws and treaties of the United States ". . . shall be
the supreme Law of the Land . . . ."' Assuming the federal law is
itself constitutional, state law may be preempted under the
Supremacy Clause in three circumstances. First, Congress can ex92. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (d) (1988).
The [Atomic Energy] Commission shall enter into an agreement under subsection
(b) of this section with any State if (1) The Governor of that State certifies that the
State has a program for the control of radiation hazards adequate to protect the
public health and safety with respect to the materials within the State covered by
the proposed agreement, and that the State desires to assume regulatory responsibility for such materials ....
42 U.S.C. § 2020 (d) (1) (1988).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (1988).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (k) (1988).
95. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
96. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 provides in pertinent part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the land; and the Judges in every
state shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution of Laws of any State to
the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. CoNsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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plicitly define the extent to which its enactments preempt state law.97
In such cases, courts need only look to the statutory language.
Second, in the absence of express statutory language, state law
is preempted if it attempts to regulate conduct in a field which Congress intended the federal government to exclusively occupy.98 Such
an intent can be inferred if:
[a] scheme of federal regulation . .. [is] so pervasive as to make

reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it, .

.

. [or it] touch[es] a field in which the federal

interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to
preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.99
However, the Congressional intent to preempt state law must be
"clear and manifest" 100 in areas which have "been traditionally occupied by the States." 10 1
Finally, state law is preempted when it conflicts directly10with
2 of
federal law, or "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment"
federal objectives. 103 Consequently, the Supreme Court has held
state laws to be preempted where it is impossible for a party to comply with both the federal and state requirements.104
In all preemption cases, the court confines its analysis to the
Congressional intent to preempt the state regulation at issue.105 This
is accomplished by analyzing the wording of the statute as well as its
legislative history.108 No preemption will be07found where state law is
only in general tension with federal goals.'
B. CongressionalRegulation
The commercial development of nuclear power over the past
thirty-seven years has been facilitated by extensive federal
regulation. 0 8
97. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 481 (1988) (discussing express
preemption); see also Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 95-98 (1983).
98. See TRIBE, supra note 97, at 481 (discussing implied preemption).
99. Rice, 331 U.S. at 230.
100. Id.
101. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
102. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941); see Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S.
725, 747 (1981).
103. See TRIBE, supra note 97, at 481 (discussing conflict preemption).
104. See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43
(1963).
105. See TRIBE, supra note 97, at 487-91.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See infra notes 110-35 and accompanying text.
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The turning of swords into plowshares has symbolized the transformation of atomic power into a source of energy in American society. To facilitate this development the Federal Government relaxed
its monopoly over fissionable materials and nuclear technology, and
in its place, erected a complex scheme to promote the civilian development of nuclear energy, while seeking to safeguard the public
and the environment from the unpredictable risks of a new technology. Early on, it was decided that the States would continue their
traditional role in the regulation of electricity production. The interrelationship of federal and state authority in the nuclear energy
field has not been simple; the federal regulatory structure has been
frequently amended to optimize the partnership. 10 9
Prior to 1954, the federal government monopolized all use, control and ownership of nuclear technology. The Atomic Energy Act of
1954,110 was passed to promote private sector involvement in the nu-

clear energy field."' The AEA opened the door to private construction, ownership and operation of commercial nuclear reactors under
the strict supervision of the five-member Atomic Energy Commission."' The primary functions of the AEC were to encourage re3
search and promote the development of nuclear power technology.1
The AEC was given the exclusive authority to license the transfer,
use and ownership of all radioactive materials in the United
109. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 193-94 (1983).
110. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
111. See 42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1988)
It is the purpose of this chapter to . . . provid[e] for (a) a program of conducting,
assisting, and fostering research and development in order to encourage maximum
scientific and industrial progress; (b) a program for the dissemination of unclassified
scientific and technical information . . . so as to encourage scientific and industrial
progress; (c) a program for Government control of the possession, use, and production of atomic energy and special nuclear material, whether owned by the Government or others, so directed as to make the maximum contribution to the common
defense and security and the national welfare, and to provide continued assurance of
the Government's ability to enter into and enforce agreements with nations or
groups of nations for the control of special nuclear materials and atomic weapons;
(d) a program to encourage widespread participation in the development and utilization of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum extent consistent
with the common defense and security and with the health and safety of the public
42 U.S.C. § 2013 (1988); see also H.R. Rep. No. 2181, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. I-I I (1954). The
national interest would be best served if the government encouraged the private sector to become involved in the development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes under a federal program of regulation and licensing. Id.
112. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 63 (1978).
113. See TOMAIN & HICKEY, supra note 39, at 392.
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States." 4 However, the AEA mandated that the development of nuclear power for commercial purposes be restricted by national secur-

ity, public health and safety concerns."' With respect to these matters, no significant role was contemplated for the states. However,

the AEA did allow existing state authority to continue to regulate
the generation, transmission and sale of electricity that would be
produced by the proposed commercial nuclear facilities.",,

In 1957, Congress indirectly affected the regulatory scope of
both the federal and state governments with the passage of the Price

- Anderson Act."' This Act sought to stimulate private sector in-

volvement in the incipient nuclear industry." 8 The Price-Anderson

Act amended the AEA by establishing a $560 million liability limit
as a consequence of any one nuclear accident." 9 Moreover, if aggregate damage claims exceeded $560 million, individual claimants
were to be subject to proportional recovery limits.'20 This amend110 S. Ct. 2270, 2276
-,
114. See English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. (1990).
115. See 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (1988). "The processing and utilization of ... nuclear material must be regulated in the national interest and in order to provide for the common defense and security and to protect the health and safety of the public." 42 U.S.C. § 2012 (d)
(1988).
116. See 42 U.S.C. § 2018 (1988); see also supra note 89 and accompanying text; see
also Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205.
Congress, in passing the 1954 Act and in subsequently amending it, intended that
the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in
the construction and operation of a nuclear plant, but that the States retain their
traditional responsibility in the field of regulating electrical utilities for determining
questions of need, reliability, cost, and other related state concerns.
Id.; see also Note, State Regulation of Nuclear Power Production:Facing the Preemption
Challengefrom a New Perspective, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 134, 144 (1981).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1988).
118. See TOMAIN & HICKEY, supra note 39, at 393. "The Act stimulated private involvement by limiting the financial liability of the [nuclear] industry." Id.
119. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (e) (1) (1988).
The aggregate public liability for a single nuclear incident of persons indemnified,
including such legal costs as are authorized to be paid . . . shall not exceed. . . (i)
$500,000, together with the amount of financial protection required of the licensee;
or (ii) if the amount of financial protection required of the licensee exceeds
$60,000,000, $560,000,000 or the amount of financial protection required of the
licensee, whichever amount is more.
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (e) (1) (C) (1988).
120. See 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (o) (1) (1988).
Whenever the United States district court in the district where a nuclear incident
occurs. . . determines. . . that public liability from a single nuclear incident may
exceed the limit of liability . . . . The [Atomic Energy] Commission or the Secretary, as appropriate, shall . . . submit to such district court a plan for the disposition of pending claims and for the distribution of remaining funds available. Such a
plan shall include an allocation of appropriate amounts for personal injury claims,
property damage claims, and possible latent injury claims which may not be discov-
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ment further required the federal government to indemnify the com-

mercial nuclear plant operator for most of that amount.12,1 However,
since the Price - Anderson Act did not codify any federal substantive
law on how to address these damage claims, state tort remedies for
harm resulting from the operation of commercial nuclear facilities
were left intact.1 22
In 1959, Congress amended the Atomic Energy Act, adding
section 274,123 to "clarify the respective responsibilities . . . of the
States and the [federal government] with respect to the regulation of
byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials." 124 This amendment set forth the procedure by which the AEC could transfer regulatory authority over certain types of radioactive material to the
ered until a later time and shall include establishment of priorities between claimants and classes of claims, as necessary to insure the most equitable allocation of
available funds.
42 U.S.C. § 2210 (o) (1) (C) (1988).
121. See 42 U.S.C § 2210 (c) (1988). "The Commission shall ... agree to indemnify
and hold harmless the licensee and other persons indemnified, as their interest may appear,
from public liability arising from nuclear incidents which is in excess of the level of financial
protection required of the licensee." 42 U.S.C § 2210 (c) (1988); but see TOMIN & HICKEY,
supra note 39, at 393.
This amount consisted of all the private insurance that the utilities could raise at the
time, which from 1957 to 1967 amounted to $60 million. The remaining $500 million was guaranteed by the federal government. Today, there is no federal contribution. Instead, licensees pay the entire insurance bill. Every ten years the Price Anderson Act comes up for renewal. Under the 1975 amendments to the Act, industry is assessed $5 million per reactor in the event of an accident. There are presently
95 nuclear power reactors which together with available private insurance exceeds
the $560 million contribution required by industry thus eliminating government
participation.
Id.
122. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 251-52 (1984) (quoting S. RaEP.
No. 296, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957).
Since the rights of third parties who are injured are established by State law, there
is no interference with the State law until there is a likelihood that the dangers
exceed the amount of financial responsibility required together with the amount of
the indemnity. At that point the Federal interference is limited to the prohibition of
making payments through the State courts and to prorating the proceeds available.
Id.
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (1988).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (a) (1988).
It is the purpose of this section (1) to recognize the interests of the States in the
peaceful uses of atomic energy;... (2) to recognize the need, and establish pro-

grams for, cooperation between the States and the [Atomic Energy] Commission
with respect to control of radiation hazards associated with use of such materials;
(3) to promote an orderly regulatory pattern between the Commission and State
governments with respect to nuclear development and use and regulation of byproduct, source, and special nuclear materials ....
42 U.S.C. § 2021 (a) (1988).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/7

18

Rittweger: Nuclear Employers No Longer Shielded From Whistleblower State Tor
Nuclear Employers No Longer Shielded

1991]

states under specified conditions. 25 Adopted state regulatory programs were required to be "coordinated and compatible" with those

of the AEC.'26 This amendment generally served to increase the
states' role in policing the nuclear power industry. However, "Con-

gress' decision to prohibit the States from regulating [all] the safety
aspects of nuclear development was premised on its belief that the
[Atomic Energy] Commission was more qualified to determine what
type of safety standards should be enacted in this complex area.' 27
Concern over the AEC's dual role as both promoter and regula-

tor of nuclear power led to Congressional action in the form of the
Energy Reorganization Act of 1974 ("ERA").128 The ERA abol-

ished the AEC and transferred its regulatory and licensing authority
to the new Nuclear Regulatory Commission. 29 Congress expanded
the NRC's duties and responsibilities in order to closely supervise
the commercial nuclear power industry. 30 The NRC was created to
ensure that public health and safety concerns were identified and

addressed.' 3 '

In 1978, Congress amended both the Atomic Energy Act 3 2 and
the Energy Reorganization Act.133 Among these amendments was

section 210,134 which encouraged employees to report safety viola1 35
tions and protected whistleblowers against employer retaliation.
125. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (b) (1988) (allowing the AEC to transfer to states, regulatory authority over byproduct, source and special nuclear materials in amounts insufficient to
form a critical mass, but prohibiting transfer of especially hazardous materials).
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 2021 (g) (1988).
127. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 250.
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988).
129. See 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (f) (1988).
130. See S.REP.No. 980, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 5470.
131. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 207.
132. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1988).
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5810-5891 (1988); see supra note 2 and accompanying text.
134. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988); see supra note 3 and accompanying text.
135. See 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988).
No employer, including a[n] [Atomic Energy] Commission licensee, an applicant
for a Commission license, or a contractor or a subcontractor of a Commission licensee or applicant, may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any
employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because the employee (or any person acting pursuant to a request of the
employee) - (1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or
cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter of the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et. seq.], or a proceeding for the administration or enforcement of any requirement imposed under this chapter of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended; (2) testified or is about to testify in any
such proceeding or; (3) assisted or participated or is about to assist or participate in
any manner in such a proceeding or in any other manner in such a proceeding or in
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However, in spite of the numerous federal amendments, Congress
left many areas of commercial nuclear energy open to state
regulation.
IV.

JUDICIAL PREEMPTION IN THE NUCLEAR FIELD

A.

Supreme Court Decisions

As states recognized the potential environmental and safety
problems associated with nuclear power, they attempted to regulate
conduct in this area. Inevitably, some of these state laws collided
with established federal legislation, resulting in preemptive
challenges. 3 6
Until the Supreme Court decided Pacific Gas & Electric Company v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,13 7 the leading federal case in the area of nuclear preemption
was Northern States Power Company v. Minnesota. 38 Northern
States Power Co. applied to the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
for a waste disposal permit for its Monticello Nuclear Power
Plant.139 One was issued subject to conditions regulating the level of
radioactive discharges as well as requirements for monitoring such
releases.14 ° Since these state mandated conditions were more stringent than those imposed by the AEC, plaintiff Northern States
sought sanctuary under the doctrine of federal preemption. 141
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit concurred in establishing the principle of federal exclusivity in the radiation safety
field.1 42 The court held that state regulations, which were more stringent than the federal laws governing the discharge of radioactive effluents, were preempted under the AEA.14' The Northern States
any other action to carry out the purposes of this chapter or the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. § 2011 et. seq.].
42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) (1988); see supra note 5 and accompanying text.
136. See infra notes 137-206 and accompanying text (analyzing the case law preceding
the English decision).
137. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
138. 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), affid mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
139. Id. at 1145. Northern was a Minnesota corporation engaged in the production and
interstate sale of electricity. Id. at 1144.
140. Id. at 1145.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1153-54. The issue in this case was whether the AEC had exclusive authority
to regulate the radioactive waste releases from nuclear power plants so as to preclude Minnesota from exercising regulatory authority over the release of such discharges from the Monticello plant. Id.
143. Id. The court rejected Minnesota's argument that the state's traditional police authority to protect public health, safety and welfare empowered it to regulate radioactive dis-
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court concluded that although Congress had not expressly preempted
state regulation of radioactive emissions, it had established an exten-

sive system of federal control over radiation hazards.4 Consequently, any state regulation with the purpose or effect of controlling
45 The Supreme Court affirmed
radiation safety was preempted.'146
opinion.
without
Northern States
In Pacific Gas, the Supreme Court held that "the Federal Gov-

ernment has occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns, ex-

cept the limited powers expressly ceded to the States."' 47 In this

case, several utilities brought a declaratory judgment action to invalidate a California statute which imposed a moratorium on the certification of new commercial nuclear facilities' 48 This temporary stoppage was designed to last until the NRC approved a permanent
radioactive waste disposal plan for nuclear waste generated by these

plants.' 49

charges. Id. at 1145.
144. Id. at 1147-53. The court added that if states were permitted to establish standards
for radioactive discharges which were more stringent than those set by the federal government,
they might utilize such authority to stifle the development of commercial nuclear power. Id. at
1154.
145. Id.
146. 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
147. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm'n., 461 U.S. 190, 212 (1983). At issue was whether a California law which conditioned
the construction of commercial nuclear plants upon findings by the State Energy Resources
Conservation and Development Commission that adequate storage and disposal facilities existed for the nuclear waste, was preempted by the Atomic Energy Act. Id. at 194.
148. See Warren-Alquist Act, CAL. PUB. Ras. CODE §§ 25000-25986 (West 1986).
No nuclear fission thermal powerplant. . . shall be permitted land use in the state,
or where applicable, be certified by the commission until both conditions (a) and (b)
have been met: (a) The commission finds that there has been developed and that the
United States through its authorized agency has approved and there exists a demonstrated technology or means for the disposal of high-level nuclear waste. (b) The
commission has reported its findings and the reasons therefore pursuant to paragraph (a) to the Legislature. Such reports of findings shall be assigned to appropriate policy committees for review. The commission may proceed to certify nuclear
fission thermal powerplants 100 legislative days after reporting its findings unless
within those 100 legislative days either house of the Legislature adopts by a majority vote of its members a resolution disaffirming the findings of the commission
made pursuant to paragraph (a).
CAL. PUB. REs. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1986).
149. See CAL. PUB.Ras. CODE § 25524.2 (West 1986); see also Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at
195 (footnote omitted). A nuclear reactor requires periodic refueling in which the "spent fuel"
must be removed and replaced with fresh uranium. Id. This spent fuel is highly radioactive
and must be carefully stored. Id. Normally, the fuel is stored submerged in a water pool at the
reactor site. Id. For many years, it was assumed that this fuel would eventually be reprocessed.
Id. Consequently, these storage pools were designed as short-term holding facilities with limited capacity. Id. The spent fuel has accumulated in these storage pools, creating the risk that
nuclear reactors would have to be shut down since there is no permanent disposal method
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The California statute's purpose was not to regulate the safety
aspects of nuclear power, but rather to regulate its economics. 150
California claimed that its nuclear plants would have to be shut
down when their on-site storage facilities were filled. Accordingly,
continued new plant construction would result in an economic risk
since the cost and timing of a permanent waste disposal plan could
not be reasonably estimated" 151 The utilities challenged on the
grounds that the AEA preempted the state moratorium. Although a
unanimous Supreme Court upheld the California state law, it also
wrote in its decision that only "the Federal Government should regulate the radiological safety aspects involved in the construction and
operation of a nuclear plant . . .". Nevertheless, the Pacific Gas

decision allowed states to continue to regulate commercial nuclear
power, but only for non-safety reasons.'5 3
The following year, in Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corporation,
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether federal law
preempts all state nuclear regulations. 5 A closely divided Court reversed the court of appeals and held that a claim for punitive damages in a state tort action did not fall within the preempted field
discussed in Pacific Gas.15 5 The Silkwood Court noted that,
"[p]unitive damages have long been a part of traditional state tort
law." 56 After reviewing the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and its subsequent amendments, the Court concluded that "[i]t is difficult to
all means of
believe that Congress would, without comment, remove' 57
judicial recourse for those injured by illegal conduct.'
Karen Silkwood was a laboratory technician and union shop
steward at a plutonium fuel rod manufacturing plant in Cimarron,
Oklahoma. 58 Silkwood and other union representatives met with
available at present. Id. This scenario could occur if there were insufficient room in the pool to
store spent fuel or if there were not enough space to hold the entire fuel core when certain
inspections or emergencies required unloading of the reactor. Id. In recent years, this problem
has taken on special urgency. Id. Approximately 8,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel have
already accumulated, with projections reaching 72,000 metric tons in the year 2000. Id.
150. See Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 213.
151. Id. at 213-14.
152. Id. at 205.
153. Id. at 207-208.
154. 464 U.S. 238, 248-58 (1984). The Court looked at whether a state-authorized punitive damages award arising out of the escape of plutonium from a federally licensed nuclear
facility was preempted because it fell within the purview of the Atomic Energy Act. Id. at 241.
155. Id. at 258.
156. Id. at 255.
157. Id. at 251 (citing Construction Workers v. Laburnum Corp., 347 U.S. 656, 663-64
(1954)).
158. Id. at 241. The plant fabricated plutonium fuel pins utilized in nuclear reactors for
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AEC officials concerning alleged safety violations at the plant.159
Shortly thereafter, during a three-day period in November, 1974,
Silkwood's person and property were contaminated by plutonium
contaminafrom the Cimarron plant. 6 0° Eight days after her initial
161
accident.
automobile
an
in
died
Silkwood
tion, Karen
The Silkwood Court established a new standard for preemption
analysis of state damage awards. The Court wrote:
[P]re-emption should not be judged on the basis that the Federal
Government has so completely occupied the field of safety that
state remedies are foreclosed but on whether there is an irreconcilable conflict between the federal and state standards or whether
the imposition of a state1 62standard . . . would frustrate the objectives of the federal law.

Simply stated, federal law preempts a state law only if it is impossible to comply with both laws. 6 3 As a result of Pacific Gas and
Silkwood, states were able to legally regulate significant portions of
the commercial nuclear power industry.
fuel. Id.
159. See Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464
U.S. 238 (1984).
160. Id. at 617-18. On November 5, 1974, Karen Silkwood became radioactively contaminated after working with plutonium through a "glove box." Id. This box is designed to
protect personnel from surface contamination by allowing the operator to handle radioactive
material through sealed glove holes in the side of the box. Id. She was immediately decontaminated and monitors detected no further contamination at the end of her shift that day. Id.
However, as a precautionary measure, urine and fecal samples were collected in order to check
for possible internal contamination. Id. The next day, upon leaving the laboratory, Silkwood
was again discovered to have been contaminated, even though she had not been working with
plutonium. Id. Once again, she was decontaminated. Id. On November 7, Silkwood was monitored upon her arrival at the plant. Id. High levels of radioactive contamination were detected.
Id. A subsequent investigation of Silkwood's apartment revealed especially high levels of radioactive contamination in her bedroom, bathroom and kitchen. Id. The radiation levels in these
areas were such that many of her personal belongings had to be destroyed. Id. Silkwood herself was sent to Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory to determine the extent of internal contamination. Id. Moreover, the urine and fecal samples taken on November 5, revealed the presence
of insoluble plutonium, which cannot be excreted from the body. Id. This undisputed evidence
indicated that Karen Silkwood's samples had been deliberately "spiked" with plutonium by a
person or persons unknown. Id.
161. Id. at 912; see The Silkwood Mystery, TIME Jan. 20, 1975, at 47-48. At the time
of her death, Silkwood was driving to meet a New York Times newspaper reporter, supposedly
with documents to substantiate her allegations of unsafe practices and procedures at the KerrMcGee plant. Id. No such documents were discovered among her personal effects from the
accident scene. Id.
162. Silkwood, 464 U.S. at 256; see Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963).
163. Id.
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JurisdictionalConflicts

Prior to English v. General Electric Company,164 several lower

federal courts had addressed the issue of whether section 210165 of
the Energy Reorganization Act'6

6

preempted state jurisdiction over

whistleblower suits. These courts were split, with some holding that
nuclear whistleblowers retained state remedies despite6 7 section 210,
while other courts held this section to be preemptive.1
In Stokes v. Bechtel North American Power Corporation, the
district court held that state actions based upon both contract and

tort law were not preempted by Congress.' 68 Charles Stokes, a nuclear engineer at one of Bechtel's plants, alleged that he was discharged in retaliation for refusing to suppress quality assurance information.' 9 Bechtel claimed that the wrongful discharge action was
preempted by section 210.170

The federal court, after reviewing the Pacific Gas' 7 and
Silkwood172 decisions, stated that "[t]he crucial distinction . . .is

between state regulation of radiological safety, foreclosed by federal
law, and regulation of other aspects of nuclear power grounded in
legitimate state policy or law.' 7 The court characterized this suit
as one of employer-employee relations and found that section 210
did not prohibit, but rather supplemented the state protections for
nuclear whistleblowers. 74
Similarly, in Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Company,

75

the

Illinois Supreme Court held that section 210 did not preempt state
remedies for nuclear whistleblowers. 76 William Wheeler brought a
retaliatory discharge action against Caterpillar after he was alleg164. 496 U.S.., 110 S.Ct. 2270 (1990).
165. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988).
166. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988).
167. See infra notes 168-206 and accompanying text (discussing various jurisdictional
conflicts prior to the English decision).
168. 614 F. Supp. 732, 744-45 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
169. Id. at 735. Under the terms of his employment agreement, Stokes was supposed to
identify and document quality assurance deficiencies in pipe support and pipe stress designs at
the Diablo Canyon plant. Id.
170. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988); see Stokes at 735. Bechtel contended that Stokes' wrongful discharge claim arose under federal statutes regulating the field of nuclear power safety
and, accordingly, was preempted by such statutes. Id.
171. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
172. 464 U.S. 238 (1984).
173. 614 F. Supp. at 741. The court rejected Bechtel's argument that the wrongful discharge claim was directed at the regulation of commercial nuclear power safety. Id.
174. Id. at 744-45.
175. 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E. 2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
176. Id. at 509-11, 485 N.E. 2d at 376-77.
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edly fired for refusing to use an x-ray machine which contained radioactive cobalt.1 77 Plaintiff asserted that since cobalt 60 is a live
source of radiation, NRC safety handling requirements mandate
more extensive training than he was given. 7 8 Wheeler further
claimed that his subsequent discharge for refusing to work under
those conditions "contravened clearly mandated public policy.' 17 9
The state court agreed, stating "[t]he protection of the lives and
property of citizens from the hazards of radioactive material is as
important and fundamental as protecting them from crimes of violence, and by the enactment of [section 210], Congress has effectively declared a clearly mandated public policy to that effect."' 180
The Illinois court concluded that this situation was analogous to
Silkwood and further stated that "it was not the congressional intent
to preempt the field."''
In Snow v. Bechtel Construction Incorporated, however, the
federal judge declined to follow the Stokes precedent.' 82 The Snow
court found section 210 to be part of the federal scheme of nuclear
safety regulation and therefore preemptive of state nuclear
whistleblower claims. 183 On October 25, 1984, James Snow informed
Bechtel that the San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station was in violation of established NRC emergency evacuation requirements.' 8"
Shortly thereafter, he sent a telegram to the NRC reporting these
violations. 18 5 In November, Snow was laid-off as part of Bechtel's
reduction in manpower. 8" Snow claimed that he was terminated after complaining about the alleged evacuation violations.' 7 The court
discounted the Stokes opinion because it had not considered the legislative history of section 210.188 According to that history, Congress

intended section 210 to be the exclusive remedy for nuclear
177. Id. at 505, 485 N.E. 2d at 374.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 511, 485 N.E. 2d at 377.
181. Id. at 509, 485 N.E. 2d at 376.
182. 647 F. Supp. 1514 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
183. Id.
184. Id.at 1516.
185. Id.
186. Id.Snow was previously employed by Bechtel as a carpenter foreman at the plant.
Id. On July 4, 1984, he informed his supervisor that some of Bechtel's employees were taking
drugs on the job. Id. Snow alleged that he was terminated on July 6, because of this
whistleblowing. Id. However, plaintiff pursued the collective bargaining grievance procedure
and was rehired as a journeyman carpenter on September 4. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.at 1518.
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whistleblowers.189
Chrisman v. Philips Industries, Incorporated, perpetuated the
Snow decision. 190 The Kansas Supreme Court concluded that a retaliatory discharge claim based upon the refusal to approve allegedly
defective nuclear industrial products was preempted.191 Richard
Chrisman, a quality assurance inspector, brought suit claiming that
he was fired for intending to submit a workers' compensation
claim.192 The court wrote, "there is massive federal legislation and
regulation in the area of nuclear safety .

.

. We hold that [section

210] is primarily a safety regulation, and that Congress has preempted the field."19
The northern California district court again had occasion to rule
on the nuclear whistleblower preemption question in Gaballah v. PG
& E."" That court, after reviewing the conflicting Stokes and Snow
decisions, concluded that section 210 of the ERA did not preempt a
state court action based on state law.19 Plaintiff claimed that he was
fired for having brought alleged discrepancies between the "as-built"
seismic safety drawings and actual conditions at the Diablo Canyon
Nuclear Power Plant to his employer's attention. 1 6
The First Circuit Court of Appeals fortified the argument
against preemption in Norris v. Lumberman's Mutual Casualty
Company9 7 That court concluded that the whistleblower provision
of the Energy Reorganization Act did not preempt state law regulations. 198 Richard Norris, a regional manager, claimed that he was
discharged after voicing concerns about the safety of certain reactor
pressure vessels." 9 The federal court commented, "[w]histle blowing
189. Id.
190. 242 Kan. 772, 751 P.2d 140 (1988).
191. Id. at._, 751 P.2d at 145. The issue was whether a cause of action for retaliatory
discharge existed on public policy grounds when an employee, who had been injured on the job
and had expressed an intent to submit a workers' compensation claim, was persuaded by the
employer to forego filing that claim and was then fired by the employer as a result of that
previous intention. Id. at 141.
192. Id. at._, 751 P.2d at 141. Chrisman was employed by Philips for over six years at
its plant in Paolo, Kansas. Id.
193. Id. at_., 751 P.2d at 145.
194. 711 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
195. Id. at 991.
196. Id. at 989. Gaballah further alleged that seismic safety at Diablo Canyon was a
matter of "extreme public policy." Id.
197. 881 F.2d 1144 (1989).
198. Id. at 1151.
199. Id. at 1145. From 1976 until his discharge in 1987, Norris was employed by Lumbermen as the Northeast Regional Manager. Id. In April, 1985, Norris investigated a complaint regarding reactor pressure vessels at the Vogle Nuclear Power Station in Georgia and
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is not directly concerned with safety standards, only the deviation

from or the flouting of them. There is no good reason for barring
state remedies to whistleblowers . .

.

.We hold that there is no con-

flict between state law actions for wrongful discharge and [section
210] .200
Most recently, in Masters v. Daniel International Corporation,
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held section 210 to be preemptive of any state remedies. 0 1 On February 2, 1984, Ron Masters

notified the NRC of safety related concerns about work he was do02
ing at the Wolf Creek Nuclear Generating Station in Kansas. Ul-

timately, the subsequent NRC investigation substantiated Masters'
complaint. 203 However, he was terminated by Daniel for allegedly

being a whistleblower2

4

Masters did not file a section 210 claim

with the Department of Labor but, rather, brought this retaliatory

discharge action.205 Relying upon the Pacific Gas decision, the court
determined that ". . . Section 210 of the Energy Reorganization Act
. . .preempts any state law claim for wrongful termination for re-

porting safety violations under the Act. 20 6
C.

The English Decision

In view of the widespread jurisdictional conflicts concerning section 21 0207 of the Energy Reorganization Act, 20 8 the Supreme Court,
concluded that a prior Lumbermen inspector had been negligent. Id. His supervisor requested
that because of a then pending litigation involving these vessels, that Norris have any reference
to the substandard inspection deleted. Id. Norris objected, but he eventually complied. Id. In
June, 1986, Norris investigated a former employee who had worked at the Seabrook Nuclear
Power Plant and discovered problems that he felt warranted a full investigation. Id. His supervisor indicated that such an investigation would interfere with completion of a Seabrook report
to the NRC. Id. In December, 1986, Lumbermen revised its inspection standards in such a
way so as to eliminate a verification technique which would have identified the defective pressure vessel at Vogle. Id. Norris objected to the revision, but took no further action. Id. In
March, 1987, PSE&G hired Lumbermen to conduct an audit of its Salem Nuclear Power
Plant in New Jersey. Id. Norris conducted the audit and shortly thereafter, Lumbermen's
Internal Security Division investigated his activities there. Id. It concluded that Norris' actions
constituted a conflict of interest and resulted in Norris' personal financial gain. Id. Lumbermen did not inform Norris or offer him an opportunity to respond to the allegations. Id. In
June, 1987, Lumbermen fired Norris. Id.
200. Id. at 1151.
201. 895 F.2d 1295 (10th Cir. 1990).
202. Id. at 1296.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988).
208. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1988).
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in English v. General Electric Company, granted certiorari to resolve the nuclear safety preemption dispute.20 9 At issue was whether
petitioner's state tort claim was so related to the "radiological safety
aspects involved in the

. . .

operation of a nuclear [facility],"21 that

it fell within the preempted field.21 '
Vera M. English, a laboratory technician at General Electric's
("GE") Castle Hayne nuclear fuel plant, complained to both GE
management and the NRC that the plant routinely violated federal
safety regulations. 212 These abuses included her co-workers' failure
to clean up radioactive laboratory spills. 21 3 Frustrated by GE's continued inaction, English, on one occasion, deliberately failed to clean
up a radioactive spill. 214 InsteAd, she surrounded the contaminated
area in red tape and several days later notified her supervisor of the
still untouched area.2"5 General Electric charged English with knowingly failing to clean up a radioactive spill and temporarily reas217
signed her.21 6 Ultimately, Vera English was fired.
209. 496 U.S-.., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
210. Id. at., 110 S. Ct. at 2278 (quoting Pacific Gas, 461 U.S. at 205).
211. Id.
212. See English v. General Electric Co., 683 F. Supp. 1006, 1008 (E.D.N.C. 1988),
683 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 496 U.S_..._, 110 S.Ct. 2270 (1990). From November 13,
1972 until March 15, 1984, English was employed as a radiation laboratory technician in the
Chemical Metallurgical Laboratory ("Chemet Lab") in GE's Nuclear Fuel Manufacturing
Department ("NFMD") at Wilmington, North Carolina. Id. At the NFMD, uranium is utilized to produce nuclear fuel. Id. On February 13, 1984, English reported to the NRC that
many safety hazards and illegal practices were present in the Chemet Lab, and that corrective
action had not been taken, even though GE had been made aware by her of similar hazards
and practices in the lab. Id. On February 24, 1984, Vera English informed the NFMD Quality
Assurance Manager of her concerns. Id.
213. Id. at 1008. "[D]uring the period of March 5-9, 1984, plaintiff spent considerable
work time cleaning up radiation contamination at and around her work station, apparently left
there by workers on preceding shifts." Id.
214. Id.
On March 5, plaintiff asked a "Rad Safety" man (especially trained personnel who,
using special instruments, detect uranium contamination) to check out her work
area to see whether he would discover the pile of contaminated nuclear material she
had collected and swept to the rear of her work table. The man declared plaintiff's
area free of contamination.
Id.
215. Id. "Upon beginning her shift on March 12, 1984, English showed her supervisor
the marked-off areas of contamination, areas which were undisturbed by interim shift workers.
Plaintiff also informed her supervisor of the Rad Safety man's failure to detect contamination
on her work bench on March 5." Id.
216. Id. "In a letter dated March 15, 1984, GE charged plaintiff with several violations
of GE and/or NRC requirements, including. . . failure to clean up contamination, knowing it
existed ...." Id. GE reassigned her to the Central Stores Warehouse. Id. at 1009.
217. Id. at 1009.
On April 30, 1984, GE's management informed English that she would have to
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English responded by filing a complaint with the Secretary of
Labor, alleging that GE's actions violated section 210 (a) of the
ERA, which makes it unlawful for a nuclear employer to retaliate
2 i
against an employee for reporting safety violations. The Secretary
dismissed the complaint as untimely under the thirty-day limitations
period provided by the statute. 219 English then filed a diversity suit
2 20
in district court, raising state law claims for wrongful discharge
221 seeking compensaand intentional infliction of emotional distress,
2
The district
tory and punitive damages from General Electric.
with
conflicted
they
that
grounds
the
on
court dismissed the actions
2 Vera English appealed
section 210 and were therefore preempted.
the district court's order dismissing her complaint for intentional in"bid" for a position in the NFMD, other than in the Chemet Lab or other controlled area, and if no position was available within ninety days she would be placed
on a "lack of available work" status. . . . [On] July 30, 1984, having obtained no
other position, GE fired English.
Id.
218. 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (a) (1988); see English, 683 F. Supp. at 1010; see also supra
notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
219. See English, 496 U.S. at..., 110 S. Ct. at 2274; see 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (b) (1988).
Any employee who believes that he has been discharged or otherwise discriminated
against by any person in violation of subsection (a) of this section may, within thirty
days after such violation occurs, file . . . a complaint with the Secretary of Labor
* * * alleging such discharge or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 5851 (b) (1) (1988).
220. See English, 683 F. Supp. at 1009 (quoting plaintiff's complaint at 41-42). "In
.. . the complaint plaintiff alleges her discharge by GE was wrongful and 'in violation of the
strong public policies embodied in the laws of the United States, which encourage and require
safe operation of nuclear facilities and require workers to report potential violations of NRC
regulations.'" Id.
221. Id. at 1017.
[A]cts on the part of GE's management were intended and did in fact cause plaintiff to suffer severe emotional distress. With respect to "extreme and outrageous"
conduct plaintiff alleges that GE's management (1) removed her from her job in the
Chemet Lab under guard as if she were a criminal, exposing her to contempt and
ridicule; (2) assigned her to a degrading "make work" job; (3) derided her as paranoid; (4) barred her from employment in controlled areas; (5) subjected her to constant surveillance in the workplace; (6) isolated her from fellow workers and did not
even permit her to eat in the company lunchroom with fellow workers; and (7) conspired to fraudulently charge her with violations of safety and criminal statutes.
Id.
222. Id. at 1007. Plaintiff English sought $1,328,645 in compensatory damages and five
percent of the net worth of defendant General Electric (approximately $2.3 billion) in punitive
damages. Id.
223. Id. at 1012 (citing DeFordv. Secretary of Labor, 700 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983)).
"The court believes Section 210 provides plaintiff with a remedy for both of her causes of
action. Her claim for wrongful discharge clearly falls within the employer conduct defined and
prohibited by Section 210 . . . [and] plaintiff would be compensated for any emotional damages which she may have suffered." Id.
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fliction of emotional distress.2 24 The 2Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals
25
affirmed and certiorari was granted.
A unanimous Supreme Court held that English's law claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress was not preempted by federal law. 226 "[I]t is clear that the state tort law at issue here is not
motivated by safety concerns ...

.27

Moreover, the English Court

set forth a new preemption standard. "[F]or a state law to fall
within the pre-empted zone, it must have some direct and substantial effect on the decisions made by those who build or operate nuclear facilities concerning radiological safety levels. '228 English's
claim for punitive damages was unequivocally legitimized as well.
Justice Blackmun wrote that "[section] 210 (d) authorizes a district
court to award exemplary damages in enforcement proceedings
brought by the Secretary [of Labor] . . . [and therefore] we cannot

conclude that Congress intended to pre-empt all state actions that
permit the recovery of exemplary damages. 2 29
V.

IMPACT OF THE

English DECISION

Section 210 of the ERA was patterned after whistleblower protection clauses contained in the Clean Air Act,23° (hereinafter
"CAA"); the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,231 (hereinafter
"FWPCA"); and the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act, 32 (hereinafter "FMHSA"). 3 3 Moreover, two of these acts have statutory
224. See English v. General Electric Co., 871 F.2d 22 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 496
U.S-..., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990). "In this diversity action, Vera M. English appeals the district
court's order dismissing her complaint on the ground that her state tort claim was preempted
by federal law." Id.
225. Id. at 23. "[W]e conclude that the lower court correctly determined that English
stated a claim but that the claim was preempted by the ERA's 'whistleblower' provisions
....

We therefore affirm the order dismissing the complaint for the reasons expressed by the

district court." Id.
226.

See English, 496 U.S. at..,

110 S. Ct. at 2281. "We conclude that petitioner's

claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress does not fall within the pre-empted field of
nuclear safety as that field has been defined in prior cases. Nor does it conflict with any particular aspect of [section] 210." Id.

227.

Id. aL., 110 S. Ct. at 2278.

228.

Id. at....., 110 S. Ct. at 2278 (emphasis added).

229.

Id. at_., 110 S. Ct. at 2280; see supra note 5 (quoting § 210 (d)).

230.

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988).

231. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1988).
232. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-962 (1988).
233. See S. REP. No. 848, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 29, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CoNo.
& ADMIN. NEws 7303.
This amendment is substantially identical to provisions in the Clean Air Act and the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act. The legislative history of those acts indicated
that such provisions were patterned after the National Labor Management Act and
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sisters. The CAA contains identical whistleblower provisions to the
Safe Drinking Water Act2" 4 (hereinafter "SDWA") and the Toxic
Substances Control Act 23 5 (hereinafter "TSCA"). Furthermore, the
Solid Waste Disposal Act 236 (hereinafter "SWDA") and the
Superfund 37 contain whistleblower language identical to the
FMHSA.
Six of these seven employee protection statutes pertain to environmental concerns. 2 3 s The CAA concedes that growth in the
amount and complexity of air pollution has occurred due to urbanization, industrial development and increasing automobile use, resulting in public health and welfare deterioration.2 39 Consequently,
the Act proposes to protect against such pollution by monitoring air
quality in the workplace. 24 0 Moreover, the CAA, in statutory language identical to section 210, prohibits any type of employment retaliation against air pollution whistleblowers. 4 1
The SWDA encompasses utilities supplying water. 4 2 The Act
promulgates maximum contamination levels 243 as well as mandating
244 and prohibiting the use of lead piping.2 45
treatment techniques
a similar provision in Public Law 91-173 relating to the health and safety of the

Nation's coal miners.
Id.
234. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f-300j (1988).
235. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1988).
236. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
237. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). "Superfund" is the acronym given to the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act.
238. The statute excluded is the Federal Mine Health and Safety Act which concerns
coal miner safety.
239. See 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (a) (1988).
240. See 42 U.S.C. § 7619 (1988).
241. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1988). "No employer may discharge any employee or otherwise discriminate against any employee with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment. . . ... 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (a) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (b)
(1988).
If. . . the Secretary [of Labor] determines that a violation of subsection (a) of this
section has occurred, the Secretary shall order the person who committed such violation to (i) take affirmative action to abate the violation, and (ii) reinstate the
complainant to his former position together with the compensation (including back
pay), terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and the Secretary may
order such person to provide compensatory damages to the complainant.
42 U.S.C. § 7622 (b) (2) (B) (1988); see also 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (d) (1988). "Whenever a
person has failed to comply with an order issued under subsection (b) (2) of this section, the
Secretary may file a civil action in.. . United States district court... [and it] shall have
jurisdiction to grant all appropriate relief including, but not limited to, injunctive relief, compensatory, and exemplary damages." 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (d) (1988).
242. See 42 U.S.C. § 300 g (1988).
243. See 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-1 (1988).
244. See 42 U.S.C. § 300 j-3 (b) (1988).
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The SWDA's discrimination prohibition, protecting complaints made
by water facility workers, is identical to that of the CAA. 246
Workers are exposed to many chemicals which may pose significant health risks.247 Accordingly, the TSCA regulates such hazardous substances and further requires employers to maintain records
on their use. 248 Workers who highlight employer deficiencies are protected by a sister provision to the CAA. 49
The objective of the FWPCA is to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical and biological integrity of American waters. 250 In
keeping with this aim, the Act sets forth comprehensive programs
for water pollution control. 21a Any factory or business which discharges wastes to a stream, river, lake or ocean is subject to
FWPCA regulations.2 52 Consequently, any employee who discloses
employer water pollution violations is also protected from retaliatory
action.253
Increases in population and economic growth led to the enactment of the SWDA.154 The objective of this Act is to institute an
environmentally safe waste disposal program and promote energy
production from solid wastes.25 American employers are prohibited
from open dumping on land and further restricted on how they dispose of petroleum base materials. 256 An identical whistleblower provision to the FWPCA protects employee acknowledgement of such
practices .257

Superfund empowers the federal government to quickly respond
245.

See 42 U.S.C. § 300 g-6 (1988).

246. See 42 U.S.C. § 300 j-9 (i) (1988); see also supra note 241.
247.

See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (a) (1988).

248. See 15 U.S.C. § 2607 (1988).
249. See 15 U.S.C. § 2622 (1988); see also supra note 241.
250.
251.
252.

See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (1988).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1252 (1988).
See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1988).

253. See 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988). "No person shall fire, or in any other way discriminate against, or cause to be fired or discriminated against, any employee or any other author-

ized representative of [the] employees.
... 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (a) (1988); see also 33 U.S.C.
§ 1367 (1988).
If [the Secretary of Labor] finds that such violation did occur, he shall issue a
decision . . . requiring the party committing such violation to take affirmative action to abate the violation as the Secretary of Labor deems appropriate, including,

but not limited to, the rehiring or reinstatement of the employee or representative of
[the] employees to his former position with compensation.

33 U.S.C. § 1367 (b) (1988).
254.
255.
256.
257.

See
See
See
See

42
42
42
42

U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.
U.S.C.

§
§
§
§

6901
6902
6907
6971

(a) (1988).
(a) (1988).
(1988).
(1988); see also supra note 253.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol8/iss2/7

32

Rittweger: Nuclear Employers No Longer Shielded From Whistleblower State Tor
Nuclear Employers No Longer Shielded

19911

to hazardous waste disposal concerns. 58 Cleanup costs are borne by
those American companies responsible for the environmental damage. 259 The statute imposes fines and penalties on employers who fail

to report improprieties 260 and protects worker allegations of such violations in language identical to the FWPCA.261
The FMHSA concerns coal miner safety.2 2 The Act codifies
mandatory health and safety standards to improve miner working
6
conditions and prevent serious physical harm or death. Furthermore, mine operators are responsible for implementing such standards.26 ' Consequently, retaliatory employer actions in265 response to
miner safety concerns are prohibited by the FMHSA.
The impact of the English decision 266 will undoubtedly be felt in

all areas of American manufacturing and business since none of
these eight statutes would prevent an employee from bringing a state

law tort claim. 2 67 Currently, the Labor Department records only a

handful of whistleblower complaints in non-nuclear industries each
year, but the numbers are increasing. 268 However, the amount of
whistleblower complaints will continue to increase as American

2 69
The Enworkers become more knowledgeable about these laws.

glish decision changes the odds for employees everywhere who find
themselves in the unenviable position of being forced to cover up
258.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (1988).

259.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988).

260.
261.
262.

See 42 U.S.C. § 9603 (b) (1988).
See 42 U.S.C. § 9610 (1988); see also supra note 253.
See 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).

263. See 30 U.S.C. § 811 (1988).
264.

See 30 U.S.C. § 801 (1988).

265. See 30 U.S.C. § 815 (c) (1988).
No person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against or cause to be

discharged or cause discrimination against or otherwise interfere with the exercise
of the statutory rights of any miner, representative of [the] miners or applicant for
employment in any coal or other mine subject to this chapter ....
30 U.S.C. § 815 (c) (1) (1988); see also 30 U.S.C. § 815 (c) (1988). "[T]he Commission shall

. . . grant[] such relief as it deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, an order requir-

ing the rehiring or reinstatement of the miner to his former position with back pay and interest
or such remedy as may be appropriate." 30 U.S.C. § 815 (c) (3) (1988).
266. 496 U.S.., 110 S. Ct. 2270 (1990).
267. The Energy Reorganization Act is included among these eight statutes; see supra
notes 230-65 and accompanying text.
268. See Lavelle, Court Lights Way to Big Awards: Nuke Whistleblowers Win, THE
NAT'L L.J., Jul. 9, 1990, at 3. In comparison, approximately 100 nuclear industry workers a

year charge that they have suffered retaliation for pointing out illegal activities by their bosses.
Id. The numbers have increased steadily from only a few cases reported annually in the late
1970's and early 1980's. Id.
269. Id.
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safety concerns or lose their jobs. 270
VI.

CONCLUSION

Both the federal and state governments have long recognized
the importance of nuclear safety.27 1 Consequently, each has enacted
statutory protections designed to achieve this end. However, section
210 of the ERA represents a Congressional intent to protect nuclear
whistleblowers, not to promote safety. 272 English v. General Electric
Company 73 affirmed this intent and continued the Supreme Court's
preemption law trend in favor of upholding these state regulations.27 4
The English decision provides states with broad statutory authority
in the area of tort remedies. Allowing whistleblowers to proceed in
state court indirectly promotes nuclear safety by subjecting employers to the threat of substantial jury awards if they retaliate against
employees. The economic aspect of state law claims may induce nuclear employers to investigate worker complaints rather than simply
discharging employees. Moreover, these remedies are no longer constrained to simply compensatory damages. Punitive damages now represent a vital new economic weapon to combat retaliatory nuclear
employers.27 5
The impact of the landmark English decision will be felt in all
areas of American industry and foster prompt employer response to
whistleblower complaints.21 6 The prospect of compensatory and punitive damages for employee injuries sustained as a result of discriminatory practices will undoubtedly affect American employers' primary decisions concerning workplace safety. The viability of
whistleblower protection laws depends on both preventing retaliatory
conduct by employers and punishing those employers who choose to
retaliate against whistleblowers for their actions.
Thomas Michael Rittweger

270. Id. "[T]he unanimity of the [Supreme] [C]ourt sends a strong signal that the justices will not allow federal pre-emption to stand in the way of whistleblowers in any industry
.".Id.

271.
272.
273.
274.
275.
276.

See
See
496
See
See
See

supra notes 83-94, 108-35 and accompanying text.
42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1988).
U.S._, 110 S.Ct. 2270 (1990).
supra notes 137-63 and accompanying text.
supra note 229 and accompanying text.
supra notes 230-70 and accompanying text.
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